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The Duelling Ethic and the
Spirit of Libel Law: Matters and
Materials of Honour in France
Matei Candea
‘Law is lukewarm; honour is extreme. Law is measured; honour is
absolute. Law is correct; honour is Just’ (Beignier and Foyer 2014, 39)

1 Introduction
If law has traditionally been understood as ‘the system of sovereign
expressions of norms, acting ideally as an instrument towards justice’
(Kang 2018, 458), then something interesting happens at the points
at which the law self-consciously encounters norms and forms of
justice which are external to it. In the particular setting explored in
this article – French libel law – ‘honour’ (l’honneur) is the name for one
such complex of norms, which stands in an uneasy relationship with
legal normativity.

Libel (diffamation) is a legal offense defined by the French law on
press freedom, voted in 1881. Within this law, diffamation is defined as
“any allegation or imputation of a fact which causes harm to the honour
or esteem [à l’honneur ou à la consideration] of the person or body to whom
the fact is imputed”.1 (Loi Du 29 Juillet 1881 Sur La Liberté de La Presse
n.d.). This intrusion or inclusion of honour in the law seems archaic:
after all, a well-established sociological narrative depicts honour as an
obsolete, ‘pre-modern’ and inegalitarian social form, which has given
Law Text Culture Vol 23 2019 00
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way to ‘modern’ conceptions of the equal dignity of individual persons
(Berger 1970; Taylor 1994) – those conceptions which purportedly
animate legal ontologies in contemporary Euroamerican settings such
as France. And yet in recent years, a Parisian court which specialises
in press law – the 17th chamber of the Tribunal de Grande Instance de
Paris – has been hearing around 200 libel trials a year.

Just as puzzling, perhaps, is the fact that the law is frequently
portrayed as a rather inefficient means to deal with matters honour.
The recalcitrance of honour as a legal matter is nicely encapsulated in
a quip heard amongst French judges, according to which ‘a libel suit is
a suit one files against oneself ’. French libel trials are public, extended
occasions for the incriminated allegations to be aired, discussed,
examined and often publicised. The purpose of this examination,
of course, is to determine whether the defendant is guilty of libel.
In practice however, it is the plaintiff ’s life and actions which are
substantially under examination, leading some critics to claim that
French libel law reverses the role of victim and accuser (Beignier and
Foyer 2014).

The invocation of honour in French law thus points to a set of
conceptual conundrums, which have also animated juridical and lay
discussions about law and honour in France. Is honour a mere archaism,
a hangover from an earlier time? Has the now sociologically ‘obsolete’
notion of honour become a mere legal fiction without foundation in
the social world? Or does the term describe some kind of persistent
problematic despite its old-fashioned ring? And – since honour, in
its prime, was a fundamentally extra-legal matter – what is the law
doing in seeking to remedy harms to honour in the first place? How
successful can it be?

In order to answer these questions, this article takes a lead from the
approach proposed by the editors and asks what materials French libel
law deploys in order to make honour matter. While the article begins
and ends with a consideration of contemporary libel law as it is applied
at the 17th chamber of the Paris Tribunal, the core of the discussion will
focus on the period in the 19th century when this law was elaborated,
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debated and first applied – a time when libel law’s jurisdiction over
matters of honour was strongly contested by an elaborate and selfconsciously ‘extra-legal’ alternative: ‘the duelling code’. Crafted in
explicit reference and contrast to the law of the land, the duelling code
of 19th century France came with its own competing ‘forms, techniques,
matters, non-textual media and bureaucratic arrangements’ (Kang and
Kendall 2019: 36, 10). Contemporary French libel law was thus crafted,
I will argue, in the shadow of the duelling code, as much as the reverse,
and it bears a number of imprints of this history. Duelling codes and
libel law came to share a number of key assumptions, particularly
in relation to autonomy, fairness and truth, and some key materials,
notably linguistic and textual forms, codes and techniques. Yet they
also diverged in their way of making honour matter: where duelling
materialised honour across language and physical violence, libel law
materialised it across language and money.

These similarities and these differences provide an insight into
the shape of contemporary French libel law. A legal materiality
perspective allows us to see that the history of libel law cannot be cast
as a straightforward instance of the legal ‘formalisation’ of a mere social
code, as traditional modernization narratives might lead us to expect
(Berger 1970). Rather, it shows the ways in which libel law came to be
haunted by the material traces of duelling, and explains why honour
remains, to this day a recalcitrant matter for French law.
2 The 17th Chamber as a duelling ground
I was not expecting, when I began my ethnography of the Chamber of
the Press and of Public Liberties of the Paris Tribunal – more usually
known just as the 17th Chamber, or simply la dix-septième – to have to
read up on the history of duelling. And yet that theme made a strangely
persistent appearance in my early conversations with judges assigned
to and lawyers who frequented that court. The 17th specialises in the
judgement of matters pertaining to the Press law of the 29 of July 1881,
which lays out the modalities and limits of public expression in France.
The law of 1881 has a rather iconic status in France as the first law to
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formally end all pre-publication censorship, and to institutionalise the
principles of freedom of speech which the French declaration of the
rights of Man had announced but French law had honoured mostly in
the breach (e.g. Droin, Charlot, and Dreyer 2011).

A key feature of the law’s form which explains its meaning and
symbolic charge in the French context is that it institutes an exception
to the general principles of responsibility enshrined in the penal and
civil codes, often described generally as ‘le droit commun’ – an exception
which extends specifically to public expression. The exception is
not however absolute, as in some interpretations of the US’s first
amendment. Rather the law specifies a list of public speech offences,
including various forms of hate speech, incitement and libel, but sets
up a number of procedural guarantees and limits to the way these can
be prosecuted.

Libel is the offence most commonly tried at the 17th, and it is in this
connection that I encountered the recurrent trope which cast the 17th
as the field in which contemporary Frenchmen and women battled out
their affairs of honour. I slowly came to see that what had first sounded
like a fanciful metaphor actually indexed a number of quite precise
aspects of proceedings at the 17th, deriving in part from the subject
matter and in part from procedural specificities of the 1881 law. Trials at
the 17th concern words and images. They thus involve much exegesis and
careful attention to meanings, contexts and implications, often at some
length. On one occasion, for instance, I witnessed a lawyer discussing
for a full 30 minutes, as part of his summing up speech (plaidoierie),
the various contextual implications and valences of the word con. Trials
were in general lengthier than those in neighbouring chambers of the
same court, in part because of a greater emphasis on and number of
witness testimonies, a fact which in turn derives from the distinctive
procedural approach to matters of fact enshrined in the 1881 law – to
which I return below. Dealing as it frequently does with libel claims
made by politicians, intellectuals and other public figures against
newspapers also means that the 17th has often been in the public eye
and has had a greater share of press coverage and high-profile trials than
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other courts on its level of jurisdiction. Finally, whereas the symbolic
stakes of trials at the 17th were often high, the material stakes were often
perceived as being comparatively low. Whereas courts on the level of
jurisdiction of the 17th can issue sentences of up to 10 years in prison,
prison sentences issued in the context of libel were nearly unheard of.
The levels of fines and damages, which typically ran to a few thousand
euros, were often described as fairly low (compared for instance to the
soaring damages known to be associated with UK libel cases).
These various features which made the 17th stand out from other
courts on its jurisdictional level were all indexed in the ‘duelling ground’
metaphor. Here was a space in which parties and their witnesses clashed
in a punctilious and literal-minded defense of their honour. Just as
duelling had alternatively been critiqued as an indulgent and wasteful
pursuit of petty resentments, and praised as the very embodiment of
fundamental principles and values, the duelling metaphor set up the
17th for an ambivalent mix of praise and critique.

This metaphor was sometimes evoked with a kind of amused
fondness, a fondness which was quite characteristic of a broad range of
actors’ feelings for the court. Indeed, the 17th was often praised in the
context of the Paris tribunal and beyond, for the quality of its judges
and specialist lawyers, and the interesting nature of the cases that
came there – cases in which matters of high principle and ‘burning
social questions’ (grandes questions de société) were often at stake, such
as the acceptable limits of humour or the nature of historical truth.
However, the ‘duelling ground’ trope could also be deployed critically,
such as when lawyer and then president of the League Against Racism
and Antisemitism (LICRA), Alain Jakubowicz, deployed it as part
of an argument for removing from hate speech offences the special
protections afforded to public speech by the 1881 law, and treating
them as ordinary law offences. Jakubowicz complained that hate speech
cases had to be tried

at the 17th chamber, where the same justice ought to be dispensed

as is dispensed in all the correctional 2 courts of France, and yet it is
not. I remember a presiding judge who came to learnedly explain to
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us that the 17th had become ‘the field of honour of the XXth century’:
instead of throwing down a gauntlet, now you send a summons. And
so we spend hours and hours in front of the 17th to find out if Mr X has
been libelled, while elsewhere committal orders are issued for years in
prison. (Jakubowicz in Collectif 2016, 35).

These ambivalences were stated explicitly, albeit playfully, in a
speech delivered by Jean-Yves Montfort, who had been a long-time
presiding judge of the 17th in the 1990s, before an audience of judges,
lawyers, journalists and others at an event celebrating history and work
of the court. In his closing comments, Montfort asked:
What is the 17th? Is it, as has sometimes been claimed, ‘a luxury justice
in the service of pettiness’, or is it on the contrary, ‘the beating heart
of democracy’? (Montfort 2018)

In sum, one might say that the duelling metaphor qualified the
17th as particular kind of ‘chronotope’ (Valverde 2015). The ‘17th-as-aduelling-ground’ is a place where time slows in a peculiar fashion: both
in the deliberateness of its deliberations, seemingly out of proportion
with the importance of the matters at hand, and in the timelessness of
its preoccupation with honour – which makes it continuous with the
ancient world of duelling.

The recurrent metaphor of the 17th as a duelling ground was
complemented by a more literal claim, which I heard on a couple of
occasions, according to which the passing of the 1881 law had coincided
with the official banning of duelling in France. This claim in effect set
up the 17th as the literal, and not merely the metaphorical, successor of
duelling grounds. The claim, as we shall see below, is factually incorrect.
But it is not entirely fanciful. For the 1881 law was indeed voted at
a time when duelling was an extremely common practice amongst
the French bourgeoisie, and the question of the relationship between
duelling and the law as competing ways of managing insult and libel
was a live one. It is to this setting that I now turn.
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3 ‘As if there were two laws’: jurisdictional disputes
The 1881 law was born amidst a flurry of duelling.3 As Nye (1998)
has shown, in the 19th century, concerns with honour pervaded French
political rhetoric, informed understandings and performances of
masculinity, sexuality and marital order, and were at the heart of tense
contentions around the management of reputation. In particular, Nye
describes the surprising vitality of the practice of duelling in the mid
to late 19th century. ‘Duels of honour’ were pervasive: disagreements
in parliament, allegations in newspapers, or insinuations of sexual
impropriety made before a handful of witnesses could all lead to duels.
High-profile duels were frequently reported in the press, with close
and careful attention to the behaviour of the participants. National
newspapers such as the Figaro even had fencing rooms installed in
their buildings to prepare journalists for the ever-present danger of
challenges by outraged subjects of their work (Nye 1998), since as
antisemitic politician and newspaper owner Edouard Drumont wrote
in 1886, ‘behind every signature everyone expects to find a chest’
(quoted in Nye 1998, 223). Duelling manuals and codes which laid
out the proprieties of duelling in careful detail were still published
in France into the early 20th century (Breittmayer 1918; Bruneau de
Laborie 1906). The 1881 law was conceived, debated and voted in
this context by parliamentarians, a number of whom were themselves
former or future duellists. Those who were not were nevertheless
steeped in this broader world of references and assumptions. Yet far
from marking the formal takeover of the management of matters of
honour by the law, the press law of 1881 was in fact considered by
many contemporaries to be as impotent in that regard as previous legal
efforts (Tarde 1892; cf. Nye 1998, 175–76).
This tension between duelling and the law as alternative ways of
making honour matter had deep roots (Billacois 1995; Kiernan 2016;
Nye 1998). From the medieval to the modern period in France, as in
many other places in Europe, a duelling nobility and state-building
monarchs were locked in a struggle over the monopoly of the legitimate
use of violence. In this struggle, duelling often seemed to have the upper
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hand. The numerous anti-duelling edicts of the pre-revolutionary period
attest to its vitality. And despite much debate, no special law was ever
passed in post-revolutionary France in order to quell duelling. While
causing death by duel was of course categorised as murder, duellists
put on trial during the 19th century were systematically acquitted by
juries (Nye 1998, 175–76).

Key to this structure of feeling was the popular idea that the law
could never truly mend spoiled honour, and that it should not therefore
interfere with the workings of the only institution (duelling) which
could. The core principle which one finds repeated ad nauseam in
accounts by both contemporaries and later commentators is that any
man who seeks redress for honour in court has forfeited it (Adolphe
Tavernier 1885; Bruneau de Laborie 1906; Pitt-Rivers 2017; Nye 1998).
Appiah points to the key importance of a certain kind of gendered
autonomy which marked dueling out – in principle at least – as the
special privilege of able-bodied men (Appiah 2011, but see Mansker
2011)4. Women, youths, the elderly and the infirm could put their
honour under the protection of another (Adolphe Tavernier 1885). For
an able-bodied man to do so – even if this other were the sovereign
state – would be to lose that privilege. As one of Fielding’s characters
expresses it: ‘A man of honour wears his law by his side’ (Fielding
2010, 642).
As this quote suggests, duelling was not merely extra-legal – a kind
of transcendent and undefinable embodiment of justice – it also came
with norms and forms which provided an alternative and competing
form of legality. This was pithily and sarcastically expressed for the
British case by Francis Bacon when he claimed that the duel
expressly gives the law an affront, as if there were two laws, one a kind
of gown-law, and the other a law of reputation, as they term it, so that
[…t]he year books and statute books must give place to some French
and Italian pamphlets (quoted in Appiah 2011, 30).

Talk of a ‘law of honour’ was more than a convenient metaphor.
The ‘pamphlets’ to which Bacon refers were the widely circulated
‘duello codes’ originating in Italy, which minutely codified the proper
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behaviour of challenged and challenging parties to ‘affairs of honour’.
The 19th century in France saw the revival of such duelling manuals,
which positioned themselves explicitly in relation to the law of the
land, albeit in slightly different ways.
4 Legal form: codifying duelling in the shadow of the law
A key material which both law and duelling deployed in relation to
matters of honour was language, both written and spoken. In order to
pin down, channel and render tractable matters of honour, both the
law and duelling codes relied on the production of authoritative texts
– codification, definition, accredited forms of reporting. They both
also relied on explicit procedures for managing and channelling verbal
discussion, negotiation, and debate.

The renaissance of duel manuals in France was begun by the
Comte de Chateauvillard, who set out in 1836 to codify duelling,
claiming this was a ‘humanitarian’ attempt to regulate the excesses of
the practice (Chatauvillard 1836; Nye 1998, 137–44). Nye argues that
the paradoxical survival and indeed expansion of duelling in France
after 1850, while the practice disappeared in neighbouring countries
such as Britain (Appiah 2011) is to be explained in part by the success
of such efforts to make the duelling code into a quasi-juridical reality,
accepted even by opponents of the duel. My interest here is more
particularly in the ways in which Chateauvillard, and duelling manuals
which followed his, deployed the materials of law in order to stake a
particular jurisdictional claim.
It is worth noting that the very notion of codification was of course
much in vogue at the time, in the wake of the broader legal codification
begun by Napoleonic jurists with the Code Civil in 1804, the Code
de Commerce in 1807, the Code penal in 1810, and so forth. A ‘Code
du Duel’ would hardly have sounded metaphorical to contemporaries
for whom duelling was a widely acknowledged social reality. While
Chateauvillard’s code couldn’t have the official imprimatur of a
legislative assembly, he echoed that mode of justification by having his
Code du duel co-signed by seventy-six men from prominent families,
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to which Chateauvillard added that ‘The minister of War, the prefects
etc. etc., have approved by letter, and as men, what they could not sign
as ministers’ (Chatauvillard 1836, 90).
In a striking instance of jurisdictional politics, the author positioned
his code outside and yet in continuity with the law of the land. On
the one hand, the Code du Duel stood as it were beside the law.
Chateauvillard began his preamble by noting that:
Whilst the code of duelling is outside the law, whilst there can be no
code but that which is sanctioned by the law, we should nevertheless
not hesitate to give this name to the rules imposed by honour, for
honour is no less sacred than governmental laws. (ibid 5)

Chateauvillard borrowed heavily from legal forms and terminology.
The structure of his work, which includes a brief ‘code’ written in
imperative numbered paragraphs, followed by a series of commentaries,
and a large collection of historical jurisprudence on duelling, is very
similar to that of 19th century explanatory treatises on laws, such
as were written for instance about the 1881 law (Ameline de La
Briselainne 1881; Faivre and Benoît-Lévy 1881; Dutruc 1882). One of
Chateauvillard’s innovations (Nye 1998, 143–44) was to codify the role
of the témoins (witnesses) whom he clearly distinguished from seconds
who might join in with the fighting. Rather, the role of witnesses was
to advise their party (les parties – another juridical term), in confidence,
about the most honourable action to take, to mediate interactions
between the two parties until the moment of the fight itself, to take
upon themselves all negotiations setting the form and modalities the
oncoming duel, to ensure the propriety of events on the field, and to
report formally on these afterwards. The role of the témoins, which
became a centrepiece of all later French duelling manuals, thus drew on
and recombined that of various legal figures. As a later manual put it:
They were first merely friendly confidants: they become judges. Later
they will be the lawyers (avocats) of a cause to which they are closely
attached. All of the genius of the duelling procedure (procedure) lies
in the fusion of these three characters (Bruneau de Laborie 1906, 32).
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Chateauvillard also highlighted the importance of the procès-verbal,
the official reports or ‘minutes’. Literally a ‘verbal trial’, a procès-verbal
is the French legal term for a detailed authenticated act of an official
proceeding. In Chateauvillard’s duelling procedure, witnesses were to
draw up procès-verbaux to record the form of the duel they had agreed
upon, and another in case of any breach of the rules on the day. A
procès-verbal would also be drawn up if one party refused the duel.
Later duelling manuals (Adolphe Tavernier 1885; Bruneau de Laborie
1906) attest to the continuing centrality of the procès-verbal in 19th
century French duelling, particularly as an official record of the duel
itself, which might then be published in the newspapers ‘in order to
give satisfaction to public opinion’ (Saint-Thomas, quoted in Adolphe
Tavernier 1885, 114). Duelling manuals sometimes even offered ‘model’
procès-verbaux suited to various occasions (Bruneau de Laborie 1906).
Chateauvillard thus set up his duelling code as a parallel legality,
alongside and in some respects echoing 19th century French law. Yet
in another sense, he also proposed that the two should be continuous.
Thus paragraph 20 of Chateauvillard’s code stipulated that it was the
duty of witnesses to faithfully report and pursue in a court of law any
breach of the duelling code (Chatauvillard 1836, 24). Chateauvillard
was playing a careful jurisdictional game there, for nothing in his
code contradicts the core principle that affairs of honour should not
be taken to the courts. Rather the law of the land is given jurisdiction
over breaches to the duelling code, which nevertheless stands inviolate
as the primary jurisdiction for matters of honour.

Chateauvillard’s ‘juris-diction’ (cf. Richland 2013), his attempt to
assert the (limited) sovereignty of the law of honour, was performatively
effective, at least for a time. Nye recounts that, soon after its publication,
the code was explicitly invoked in court-cases concerning duels and
thus achieved a ‘quasi-juridical status’ (Nye 1998, 142).
5 Duelling spirit: codifying public speech in the shadow of
the duel
If duelling manuals made frequent references to the law, legal texts
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and debates surrounding libel did not talk much of duelling. And yet a
close reading reveals the shadow cast on legal attempts to make honour
matter, by the practices of duelling sketched above. In particular, the
1881 law folded into its logic a concern with the autonomy of the
parties in contests of honour which recalled in some respect the figure
of the duellists standing on the edge of the law.

Once again, this was achieved in part through codification. Much
of the press law of 1881 drew upon definitions and regulations which
had come before (Faivre and Benoît-Lévy 1881). In assembling it,
legislators sifted through the entangled mess of post-revolutionary
laws and ordinances concerning public expression, with the explicit
aim of selecting the most ‘liberal’ aspects of these and collating them
into one single systematic law (Lisbonne 1880). Aside from the much
vaunted elimination of pre-publication censorship (which had already
been attempted and reversed before), the main claim to novelty of
the 1881 law therefore rested in its comprehensive and systematic
form. The law covered aspects of public expression, ranging from the
permitted location of postering during election periods to insults to
foreign heads of state, and it replaced and abrogated no fewer than
42 extant laws concerning the press (ibid. 8317). Tellingly, Eugène
Lisbonne, in the report which proposed the law to the chamber of
deputies, noted that ‘The law which we have the honour to propose to
you is a complete code, which might be called: CODE OF CRIMES
AND OFFENCES COMMITTED BY MEANS OF THE PRESS
AND SPEECH’ (ibid 8291).
The explicit codification of the limits of public speech into one single
and comparatively simple document replacing a previously murky set
of overlapping constraints and controls was intended as an inherently
radical move. The impulse to make the law easily knowable related to
the clear line which proponents of the law sought to draw between prepublication censorship (le régime préventif ), illiberal and illegitimate,
and legal intervention after publication (le régime répressif ), understood
to represent a legitimate and liberal form of governance (Dury 1995).
The logic of this distinction turns entirely on the imagined integrity of
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the individual speaker, their willingness to express themselves publicly,
even in the full knowledge of later legal consequences. Key to this is
the clarity and concision of the law. The individual must know what
chances they are taking. Thus, in a proposed amendment to the 1881
law, senator Jules Simon had argued that the clarity of the terms of
the law is paramount, since:
‘I believe it is absolutely necessary that the one who takes upon himself
to judge the conduct of a politician in a newspaper article, can do so
with all freedom. I do not say ‘with all safety’, for it can indeed happen
that the author intends to expose themselves to danger [courir un
danger]; an author can sometimes say to himself: there is a danger to
me in writing this, I know it. But he must know it’ (Simon quoted in
Dutruc 1882, 117).

Without explicitly evoking dueling, this vision of the autonomous
speaker ready to brave the law and face danger clearly echoed that
alternative way of taking individual responsibility for one’s speech.
Rather than simply manage public expression in a sovereign fashion, it
sought to lay down clear rules, and left it open to individuals to break
them at their risk.
This general orientation is also visible in the specific procedural
exceptions introduced by the 1881 law. Not unlike the way in which
Chateauvillard devised a special jurisdiction for dueling, encompassed
by yet autonomous within the law of the land, the 1881 law intentionally
set the management of public speech apart from other matters of law
and gave it an exceptional regime (un regime dérogatoire au droit commun).

In that spirit, the 1881 law set out precise and rather difficult
requirements upon plaintiffs – in order to be valid, an act of accusation
would need to specify the specific phrase or words at stake, and which
precisely of the various speech offenses were being alleged (libel
against a private individual, libel against a public official, insult, etc.).
Cases could be – and to this day still are – dismissed on the grounds
that a statement had been identified as libellous when it was in fact
insulting. In the former case, the incriminated statement must include
a factual claim, whereas in the other it must not. Thus for instance to
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call someone a ‘thief ’ might count as libel or as an insult depending
on context. Seeking redress under the wrong heading would lead one’s
case to be dismissed, as would an act of accusation drawn up without a
sufficiently precise quote of the passages. Similarly stringent procedural
rules hemmed in the timings of the various acts of accusation and
exchanges of pre-trial information, depending upon the location of the
plaintiffs and defendants. The law also broke with the droit commun by
reducing the prescription of public speech offenses to three months.

These procedural precisions echo in many ways the highly formalized
rules surrounding the giving and taking of challenges in dueling.
Dueling manuals of the 19th century, beginning with Chateauvillard,
set out extremely precise instructions for the management of the
negotiations leading up the fight itself. As with dueling, much of the
‘action’ of a libel trial, even today, happens before the matter comes
to court, in the exchanges of formal communications between the
lawyers of both parties.

Critics of the 1881 law frequently refer to these procedural niceties
as ‘traps’ (les chausse-trappes, Bonnal 2011) designed to make life difficult
for defendants – evidence that the law is insufficiently protective of the
rights of victims of the press. Proponents of the law, on the other hand,
argue that allowing any form of imprecision in the wording of acts of
accusation brings back a kind of arbitrariness – implicitly echoing the
arguments of Jules Simon, the idea is that an author must know what s/
he is being accused of. Similarly, the brevity of prescription is sometimes
explained by the need to deal with words while their meanings and
implications are still fresh, clear and unclouded by time. Amongst
judges I spoke to, the brevity of prescription often also involved some
implicit assumptions about the taking of offense – genuine offense is
understood as an immediate affective reaction. To take offence belatedly
at something that was written a long time ago seems insincere. One
is reminded here of the words of the dueling manual by Bruneau de
Laborie: ‘Modern society […] expects, not without reason that any
insulting remark, any offensive action must produce […] a painful
nervous impression, immediately followed by a reaction and a need
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for personal revenge’ (Bruneau de Laborie 1906, 14). Dueling manuals
similarly set clear temporal limits to the various steps of the pre-duelling
negotiation, which must normally occur within 48 hours of the offence
being committed.

Proponents of the law also note that these defenses against the
arbitrariness of plaintiffs are carefully counterbalanced by other aspects
in which the law breaks with le droit commun. Notably in the fact
that, against broader French legal principles, the 1881 law holds the
defendant in a libel case to be in presumed bad faith – it falls to the
defendant, not to the plaintiff, to prove that they were in good faith
in making the allegations they made (Bigot 2017, 6). This balance is
commonly expressed in terms of the familiar tension between the
protection of freedom of speech and the protection of individuals
harmed by speech. But in the case of libel, it also takes on a rather
different valence, namely that of a concern with ‘evening out the odds’
between plaintiff and defendant. This is not without recalling a similarly
meticulous attention to the fairness of conditions of duels, expressed not
only through an attention to the nature and characteristics of weapons
used, but also through the consideration of questions such as how should
one deal with differences of age or ability between duelists, can someone
duel when they are wounded or otherwise physically impaired, etc.
In some respects, it is almost as if the 1881 law – in relation to
matters of honour – sought to make the sovereign power of law stand
aside even in criminal matters in order to make space for the parties to
take things into their own hands. Thus the 1881 law stipulated that,
exceptionally in the case of the criminal offenses of libel and insult
against private persons, the state can only prosecute on the basis of
a complaint by the plaintiff (and that the prosecution would cease if
the plaintiff removes their complaint). The plaintiff also had a choice:
they could decide whether to pursue their case in a civil or in a penal
jurisdiction. The latter brought with it a certain added weight – the
censure of the state and the risk of a fine, added to damages – but
the former freed the plaintiff from a number of the procedural
requirements attached to criminal prosecution (Dupeux and Massis
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2002 unpaginated). Contemporaries could hardly have missed the
obvious echo between this provision and the fundamental rule of
dueling codes according to which the offended party has the choice
of weapons. These analogies still resonate a century later in lawyers
Dupeux and Massis’ recent comment that ‘this choice left to the victim
created a disequilibrium and a break in the equality of weapons between
the criminal trial and the civil trial’ (ibid.).

But the procedural exceptions which contribute most to the
distinctive character of trials relating to the 1881 law concern the rules
around proof. As has often been noted, French criminal justice tends
towards an inquisitorial rather than an adversarial regime of veridiction
(Garapon, Papadopoulos, and Breyer 2003; Hodgson 2005; Terrio
2009, 44–46). From the involvement of magistrates in investigations
(l’instruction), via the central importance of written files, through to
the physical and procedural set up of French courtrooms and trials,
French criminal justice is frequently taken to epitomize the extraction
of truth by institutional examination – as opposed to the adversarial
production of truth in dramatic courtroom clashes between parties. Yet
press law introduced an exception in this respect also by systematically
excluding the question of the truthfulness of libelous allegations from
the inquisitorial apparatus, and sometimes from the space of the
court itself. To understand this seemingly paradoxical relationship to
truth, we need to take a step back to examine the mode of veridiction
associated with dueling. This brings us to a consideration of the diverse
materials, beyond texts and words, out of which law and dueling sought
to make honour matter.
6 Matters of honour and matters of fact
The fact that duelling was a procedure essentially concerned with truth
is borne out by the importance of ‘giving the lie’ (le démenti) as an
element of dueling procedure. On most accounts of duels involving
insulting or libelous allegations, it is not the allegation itself, but rather
the response – the claim that the allegation is a lie – which marks the
formal start of proceedings (Shapin 2011, 107–10; Nye 1998, 177).
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By the 19th century, the thought that winning a contest of arms might
demonstrate (perhaps by divine intervention) the truth of one’s factual
allegation had certainly fallen away. The truth at stake in dueling was
not directly the truth of the factual statement which had sparked the
matter, but rather the truth of one’s honourability. A factual allegation
impugned one party’s honourability, they responded by impugning that
of the accuser (by calling him a liar). Both parties then had to prove
their challenged honourability by respectively issuing and accepting a
challenge to duel – and by observing the correct conduct throughout
the proceedings to their bloody end. The procès-verbaux which recorded
at the end of the duel that ‘honour had been satisfied’ certainly did
not return to consider the epistemic status of whatever allegation had
initially sparked the affair. In other words, dueling was concerned with
the truth of matters of honour, not the truth of matters of fact.

The distinctive way of managing matters of fact and proof in the
1881 law reflects this problematic. Proponents of the law drew on
a history of legal theory predating the revolution to argue that an
allegation could be defamatory even if it were true, since ‘one can
hurt someone by publishing the evil one knows, just as much as in
publishing the evil one imagines’ (Dareau, quoted in Lisbonne 1880,
8302). As in the case of dueling, the facts of the matter were, in essence,
immaterial to matters of honour. The law therefore initially also forbade
a defendant in a libel case to seek to prove in court the truth of their
allegation, since such a proof would be legally immaterial and would
merely continue to publicise the offense – ‘to prove the truth of one’s
libelous claim would be to libel twice over’ (Ibid. 8304). A number of
contemporaries complained that this unwillingness of law to enter into
matters of fact contributed to encouraging duelling in order to clear
one’s name (Tarde 1892, 87–99), a perspective shared by Nye (1998,
176). Yet it is worth noting that, in this way, the law rejoined dueling in
shifting the onus from questions of fact to questions of honour. What
remained to be debated in a libel trial, once matters of fact were taken
out of the equation, was precisely matters of honour: were the alleged
facts in fact contrary to honour? Was the alleged libeler in ‘good faith’
in alleging them?
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A liberal-minded libel law encased within a ‘code’ of the press
nevertheless ran into difficulties in seeking to apply this anti-factual
principle consistently. For aside from the problematic of honour, the
1881 law also inherited the liberal problematic of allowing the press to
act as checks on the behavior of public officials (Habermas 1992). The
1881 law thus made an exception to its prohibition against matters of
fact, in the case of libels directed at public officials. In that case, the
proof of one’s libelous claims was allowed and accepted as a defence.
Yet it remained a matter for the parties to prove or disprove these facts
in court, and the judges themselves did not take on an inquisitorial
role in this regard.
7 (Im)material consequences: language, money and blood
However much libel law replicated or echoed the form of dueling
codes in relation to matters of honour, it was however hampered by
its fundamental reliance on that ‘primary legal material’ (Kang and
Kendall, 2019: 19) – language. However much they may shy away
from matters of fact, courtroom attempts to resolve matters of honour
necessarily operated by heaping more talk on injurious talk – and thus
always ran the risk of exacerbating them.

Duelling, by contrast, grounded its ability to shift the onus from
matters of fact to matters of honour in the way it combined language
and textual codification with something radically different: violence,
blood and bodily harm. In his preface to Tavernier’s manual, journalist
and duellist Aurelien Scholl writes that:
The offender and the offended, when they come out of the courtroom,
keep the hatred which had brought them to the feet of the law. The
poisoned words of lawyers have only added to the anger of the parties
[…] A duel on the field ends quite otherwise. Whatever the result of
the fight, […] whether the sword has entered the chest or glanced
off a rib, everything is truly over. The offense has been washed
and no judgement, no court decision can rival the procès-verbal in
which witnesses declare that honour has been satisfied. Duelling is a
convention which not only has force of law but is even superior to the
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law since the judge can only give satisfaction to one party, whereas the
[dueller’s] witnesses return both parties unscathed and free from any
future reproach. (Scholl in Adolphe Tavernier 1885, Iv).

This focus on violence and embodiment runs through the duelling
manuals, the bulk of which consist of detailed regulations concerning
the nature and use of weapons, the propriety of wearing or removing
protective clothing, the acceptability of certain kinds of movements
on the field, the nature and extent of wounds, and other such matters.
Similarly it is through an attention to the fine nuances of the behaviour
of duellists on the field, carefully relayed by newspaper articles, that
late 19th century Frenchmen and women evaluated whether, in point
of fact, honour had been satisfied at the end of a duel (Nye 1998).

This meticulous attention to violence and the play of bodies marked
duelling’s specificity as a ‘technology of honor’, as Piccato (1999) has
argued for contemporary Mexico. By stretching matters of honour over
a material canvas made of words and (regulated) bodily harm, duelling
raised the stakes in a way which allowed verbal insults to be ‘washed’,
and matters of factual allegation to be dissolved in proof positive of
honourable courage.
The law’s way of raising the stakes, by contrast, relied on attaching
language to violence only in the relatively mild form of prison sentences
(ranging from a 5 days to six months for libel and 5 days to two months
for insult). Rather, the main extra-linguistic material through which
the law sought and still seeks to raise the stakes of libel and insult is
money. Each speech offence came with a specified fine, to which the
law of course added the possibility for victims to demand damages.
This reliance on money, far from competing with duelling’s
reliance on blood to raise the stakes, was perhaps the most obvious
respect in which the law failed as a technology of honour for 19th
century French adepts of the duel. For duelling codes made clear that
monetary considerations and calculations were radically incompatible
with honour. These codes for instance stipulated complex rules to avoid
sullying matters of honour with matters of money in cases where the
offender owed a debt to the offended or vice versa. The law’s reliance
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on money was thus singled out explicitly by some authors as the mark
of its inability to truly manage matters of honour:
Unfit to evaluate and differentiate the damages [of honour], courts
would also be incapable to compensate them without bringing into play
a system of conventional equivalences to which the character of some
peoples, and ours in particular, will always be hostile. We belong to a
race amongst whom honour doesn’t come with a price list. (Bruneau
de Laborie 1906, 9).

Accordingly, one variation on the notion that an offended person
lost their right to duel if they went to the court stipulated that this only
applied if they had received financial damages (Ibid. 145). The same
author also notes that some newspapers clearly use libel as a commercial
strategy to boost sales, and that this justifies that such newspaper
owners and journalists be ‘excluded from the laws of honour’ and quite
simply taken to court (ibid 143).

I would argue, however, that it was not so much money itself, but
rather calculation, which made the 1881 law’s system of fines seem to
so many an improper technology for managing matters of honour. The
thought that fines set by the law were too low was a frequent complaint
(A. Croabbon 1894, 399). But none of these commentators suggested
what would constitute a proper ‘tarif ’ for matters of honour. Rather, I
would suggest that these complaints follow a different implicit logic:
in order to provide an equivalence for honour, money would need to be
used in such a way that it moved beyond normal calculability (the world
of ‘price lists’): a fine of ‘25 to 2000 francs’ remained within the bounds
of everyday calculation, such that one might imagine, as it were, buying
the right to insult someone at that price, or valuing one’s honour as in a
market transaction. By contrast, the enormous sums reputed to be paid
in English libel trials moved money beyond matters of calculation, of
buying and selling, and into existential grounds – one’s life might be
fundamentally altered by such transactions. A reasonable amount of
money sullies honour. An incalculable amount of money might repair it.
One can also exit calculation from below. The manual which forbids
duelling after financial damages have been received specifically excepts
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from this rule the plaintiff who only asked for one Franc in damages
– a demand known in French law as ‘le franc symbolique’ (Bruneau
de Laborie 1906, 146). Taking matters to court while reducing a
demand to a symbolic minimum – in effect waiving one’s legal right
to more substantial damages – enabled plaintiffs to speak of honour in
the language of money. This use of money to signify honour remains
important to this day. Many libel plaintiffs sue for the euro symbolique,
or, when they ask for more, are nevertheless only granted one euro in
damages when the court finds in their favour.

Conversely, some late 19th century duellers began to worry that
their key material currency, violence, might be cheapened in such a
way as to become calculable. Whereas, as we saw above, a key concern
of Chateauvillard’s manual in 1836 had been to ‘tame’ and civilise the
duel, using a legalistic framework in order to limit in particular the
occurrence of deaths by duelling, early 20th century manuals (Bruneau
de Laborie 1906; Bibesco 1900) were consciously invested in actually
trying to heighten the physical stakes of duelling, to avoid them ending
‘without blood being spilled’. These concerns were prescient. When
duelling eventually died out in early 20th century France, it was neither
through the effect of legal repression nor through the success of libel law
in wresting matters of honour from the grip of duello codes. According
to Nye, the demise of duelling is best explained by broader shifts in
early 20th century configurations surrounding violence, masculinity
and self-sacrifice, in which the mass deaths of world war I played
no inconsiderable part. To court one’s death (or more probably a few
fleshwounds) over matters of reputation in an elaborate ritual fashion
came to seem quite simply ridiculous in the light of the protracted
horrors of that conflict (Nye 1998, 216).
8 Conclusion: honour as a recalcitrant matter of law
In sum, libel law did not, in the end, kill the duel. It did however
survive it. Libel law, which had developed in the shadow of duelling as
an alternative way of making honour matter, now holds the field. And
yet, now bereft of its competitor, the law seems slightly uncertain about
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how precisely to make honour matter. As one judge – I will call him
Judge R – put it,
The notion of honour and esteem – it’s hardly as clear in people’s minds
in the 21st century as it was in the 19th, when these notions… one could
speak of a ‘code of honour’ if you like, there were rules, there was what
was done and what wasn’t done.

Once these explicit codes had fallen away, the law’s purchase on
honour required a partial redefinition of the problem. One judge,
responding to the formulation of my question (‘How does one judge
questions of honour?’), replied by highlighting the fact that his focus
was not on honour per se, but on legal categories and definitions:
Judge S: in reality we’re not judging questions of honour, […] we’re
judging if a statement is [an allegation of] a precise fact, which can be
subjected to a debate about its truth, which causes harm to the honour or
esteem of the person. […] Me: so, precisely, what is that…? […] To me,
seeing it from the outside, it seems pretty complex… Judge S: No,
because ‘honour’, like that doesn’t mean anything, but it’s not honour
we are judging it’s “infringements on honour and esteem as understood by
the law of the 29th of July 1881” which could be either the allegation of a
criminal offence, or the allegation of a morally condemnable behaviour.

This is a prime instance of the type of metalinguistic move described
by scholars as ‘juris-diction’: “law language in use” (Richland 2013,
213). The portions I have highlighted in italic are either direct quotes
from the 1881 law, or stock jurisprudential formulations, repeated
in judgement after judgement. Judge S is not merely arguing about
law’s ability to encompass questions of honour, to make honour into a
legal matter – he is demonstrating and performatively shoring up the
existence of ‘honour as defined by law’.

The judge’s final sentence points to an important jurisprudential
mechanism through which libel law has managed to loop the bulk of
the materiality of honour back into itself: the majority of things which
are damaging to honour, judges frequently noted, are also against the
law. On this view, then the law becomes (mostly) self-sufficient since
it has already defined elsewhere the content of that category. Libel
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becomes (mostly) an allegation of illegal behaviour (murder, theft,
abuse in its various forms and so forth), and ‘honour’ is thus captured
by the terms set by the law.

The residual category of ‘morally condemnable behaviour’ admittedly
eludes this complete self-referential closure. Yet judges can point to
jurisprudence in which the French high court has brought aspects of this
residual category into the law – for instance by ruling that allegations of
marital infidelity no longer constituted an affront to honour in view of
‘the evolutions of social mores and conceptions of morality’ (implicitly,
in contemporary France) (Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre civile 1,
17 décembre 2015, 14-29.549, Publié au bulletin 2015). The ruling is
partial – it only captures into law one infinitesimal part of the endless
field of ‘morally condemnable behaviour’. But its value is exemplary: it
makes clear in principle that this kind of capture is possible.

And yet, by the same token, the capture of honour by the law
remains necessarily incomplete. In deciding whether a particular
statement can be legally qualified – can come to matter, legally – as libel,
French judges reach ‘outside’ the legal, to ask whether the defendant’s
honour has been harmed. But in reaching for ‘honour’, judges implicitly
acknowledge an alternative form of “societal” adjudication – the ghost
of a duelling code which has now passed away. Today as in the 19th
century, honour not only exceeds but also reduplicates law’s ways of
making things matter.
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1. ‘Toute allégation ou imputation d’un fait qui porte atteinte à l’ honneur ou
à la considération de la personne ou du corps auquel le fait est imputé est une
diffamation’
2. The tribunal correctionnel is a French first-instance court in penal matters.
Its equivalent in civil matters is the Tribunal de Grande Instance.

3. The discussion that follows draws significantly on Nye’s outstanding
account of the place of duelling in 19th century France (Nye 1998, 127–
216), as well as on my own reading of a number of 19th century duelling
manuals. Nye’s main concern is with changing forms of masculinity and
male codes of honour in modern france, but he discusses at various points
the law’s weakness in the face of duelling. While this is an important
observation, my own focus here is more on the ways in which duelling
and libel law borrowed from each others’ form, concerns and materials.

4. The gendered politics of 19th century French honour are actually rather
more complex than they appear, both in the contemporary literature
and in much later historiography, which has overwhelmingly tended to
describe honor codes as definitially premised on the exclusion of women.
Andrea Mansker (2011) has shown that 19th century honour codes in
France in fact became a tool for women as well as men to reshape and
challenge traditional gendered roles. Her book explores disputes around
honor, duelling and insult as an unexpected context for early French
feminist politics. To forget the agentive role of women in making claims
in defence of their own honor, she rightly notes, is precisely to reinscribe
the stereotype of women’s passivity inherent in dominant discourses of
honor in the 19th century.
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